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Financing Experimentation†
By Mikhail Drugov and Rocco Macchiavello*
Entrepreneurs must experiment to learn how good they are at a new 
activity. What happens when the experimentation is financed by a 
lender? Under common scenarios, i.e., when there is the opportunity 
to learn by “starting small” or when “noncompete” clauses cannot 
be enforced ex post, we show that financing experimentation can 
become harder precisely when it is more profitable, i.e., for lower 
values of the known arm and for more optimistic priors. Endogenous 
collateral requirements (like those frequently observed in micro-
credit schemes) are shown to be part of the optimal contract. (JEL 
D82, G21, G32, L25, L26)
Each of us has much more hidden inside us than we have had a chance 
to explore. Unless we create an environment that enables us to discover 
the limits of our potential, we will never know what we have inside of us.
 — Muhammad Yunus, Founder of Grameen Bank (Yunus 2007, xvii)
When people start a new activity, they might not know how profitable it is, or how good they will be doing it. They can only learn by trying it out. In other 
words, people must experiment to learn about the activity or about themselves. An 
important example of such a scenario is a person starting a business. This may be 
a poor woman in a slum in India trying to open a small shop, or an IT-entrepreneur 
in Silicon Valley hoping to found the next Google. In either case, if initial capital 
has to be borrowed, the lender—be it a microfinance institution in India or a venture 
capitalist in the United States—finances the experimentation.
What happens when the experimentation is financed by a lender? The lender 
should take into account that the borrower might misbehave, for example, by shirk-
ing or by diverting the loan; also, the borrower might (privately) acquire some infor-
mation relevant to the continuation of the project. In order to study such a setting, 
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this paper builds a simple model that embeds a two-period experimentation problem 
into a lending relationship. The central insight of the paper is to show how, in the 
context of experimentation, projects with higher net present value can be systemati-
cally harder to finance.
A standard experimentation setting arises, broadly speaking, when certain activi-
ties undertaken today generate valuable information that can be used in future deci-
sion making.1 In its simplest form, standard experimentation involves, in at least 
two periods, a choice between one activity with known returns (the so-called known 
arm), and another activity with initially unknown returns (the so-called unknown 
arm). Experimentation is then a particular form of investment: it involves a trade-off 
between short-term costs of generating information and long-term benefits of using 
it. Therefore, the higher the discount factor, the lower the value of the activity with 
known returns and the more optimistic is the prior belief about the unknown arm, 
the more the decision maker finds it attractive to experiment.
The paper studies a two-period model in which in each period an agent can start a 
project. Initially, both the agent and the lender are uninformed about the effort costs 
needed to complete the project. Upon starting the project, the agent learns her effort 
costs. While it is optimal to complete the project regardless of the agent’s effort 
costs since the investment is already sunk, the agent might decide not to exert the 
effort and to divert the capital for private benefit. In the second period the agent can 
obtain another loan, depending on the first-period outcome and her communication 
with the lender.
Equipped with this simple benchmark, we study the resulting financing prob-
lem under a number of plausible scenarios. First, we consider the case in which 
the borrower can experiment by “starting small”.2 We find that obtaining credit to 
finance the experimentation might become harder precisely when experimenting is 
more valuable. By experimenting, the borrower privately learns about herself and, 
therefore, in addition to the standard moral hazard problem associated with borrow-
ing, there is an adverse selection dimension which emerges after the loan has been 
disbursed. The prospect of a larger second-period project might make the selection 
of the right type of borrower more difficult since entrepreneurs have high incen-
tives to fake short-term performance in order to enjoy higher rents in the future. For 
the same reason, a lower payoff of the known arm, i.e., the outside option, makes 
financing experimentation more difficult. In other words, the future rents which are 
helpful in solving the moral hazard problem (see, e.g., Rogerson 1985 and Bolton 
and Scharfstein 1990) come at the cost of rendering the adverse selection problem 
more severe.
Second, we consider the case in which the borrower can leave the relationship 
with the original lender and seek finance from alternative lenders in the second 
period. Motivated by empirical evidence, we consider two different scenarios. First, 
we consider the case in which “noncompete” clauses can be enforced, as in venture 
1 See Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for a survey.
2 A large body of work notes how firms and relationships initially start small and then grow over time (see, e.g., 
Rauch and Watson 2003 for a theoretical analysis, and Eaton et al. 2008 and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 
2012 for empirical evidence on sales patterns in new foreign and domestic markets, respectively).
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capital contracts (see, e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 2003). Under this scenario, we 
show that the results described above are completely robust to ex post competition. 
Second, we consider the case in which “noncompete” clauses cannot be enforced, as 
is likely the case for bank lending to SMEs (see, e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena 2010) 
or in microcredit lending in developing countries (see, e.g., Karlan and Morduch 
2010). Under this scenario, we obtain a new result: financing experimentation can 
become harder when initial priors about the profitability of the unknown arm are suf-
ficiently optimistic. This happens because a higher likelihood of successful experi-
mentation allows an outside lender to offer better contractual terms to the borrower 
once the initial sunk cost of experimentation has been financed by the inside lender.
Finally, we explore the robustness of these results to the case in which the bor-
rower has access to a saving technology. The insight that experimentation can 
become harder to finance precisely when it is most valuable is robust to this exten-
sion. In addition, the analysis also highlights how access to savings and ex post 
competition among lenders interact to shape access to finance.
The optimal contract in our model is similar to contracts typically offered in 
practice. The model highlights how retained earnings can be used to finance pay-
ments which induce the bad type of borrower to relinquish the project in the second 
period. This can be achieved, for example, by using retained earnings to endog-
enously build up collateral. The optimal contract, therefore, can mimic compulsory 
saving requirements (CSRs), a common practice observed in microcredit that has, 
however, received little theoretical attention.3 Similarly, in venture capital “purchase 
options” allocate to the investor the right to acquire control over the project at a pre-
specified price. When the investor exercises the option she effectively pays an exit 
fee to the entrepreneur (see, e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 2003). Besides rationaliz-
ing contractual features that appear to be used in practice, the model yields a number 
of testable predictions on the relationship between collateral, loan terms, and project 
outcomes that are discussed in detail at the end of the paper.
related Literature.—This paper belongs to a growing literature that combines 
experimentation and agency problems. We apply our framework to a financing set-
ting, which suggests to focus on a different mix of agency problems and, more 
importantly, to consider several extensions, e.g., scalability, competition, access to 
savings, which are usually left unexplored in the literature. As a result we derive a 
number of novel results, e.g., the nonmonotonicity of access to finance with respect 
to the discount factor, the outside option, and the prior.
Bergemann and Hege (2005) consider an agent who can either explore an innova-
tive project or shirk, in which case the project outcome (failure) is not informative.4 
As in other dynamic contracting models without commitment (see, e.g., Laffont 
and Tirole 1987) they find that a higher discount factor can render financing more 
3 Under CSRs, a share of the repayment from earlier loan cycles is locked in into a saving account until the 
completion of the final loan cycle. CSRs are a pervasive, yet understudied, feature of microfinance schemes (see, 
e.g., Morduch 1999). Most of the theoretical work on microfinance has focused on joint liability, a far less common 
contractual element of those schemes (see surveys in Ghatak and Guinnane 1999 and Karlan and Morduch 2010).
4 See also Bergemann and Hege (1998) which is “a preliminary analysis of the same basic model” (Bergemann 
and Hege 2005, 723).
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 difficult when the agent’s actions are observable. A key difference with our paper is 
that we assume the lender has full commitment power. In Manso (2011) the agent 
can experiment, shirk, or exploit a known activity. He shows that motivating experi-
mentation requires dramatically different incentives from standard pay-for-perfor-
mance schemes, e.g., rewards for failure. Our application to financing suggests to 
consider different agency problems and focus on different comparative statics lead-
ing to the central insight that projects with higher net present value can be system-
atically harder to finance and implement. A contemporaneous paper by Bouvard 
(2012) studies a real-option model where a borrower experiments and the timing 
of financing is one of the contractual variables. There, the borrower starts being 
better informed than the investor about the probability of success while the costs 
of experimentation are exogenous. There are no results about the effects of the dis-
count factor. Moreover, as mentioned above, none of these papers considers ex post 
competition between lenders nor access to savings by the agent.5
In Levitt and Snyder (1997) and Inderst and Mueller (2010) the principal also 
faces the combination of the moral hazard and interim adverse selection where the 
project is terminated (or the agent is fired) following bad news revealed by the 
agent. However, the mechanism at work there is different from ours. In these two 
papers, the project outcome is a signal about the agent’s effort and is used to elicit 
the effort. If the project is terminated, the outcome stays unknown and, therefore, 
acting upon information ex post intervenes with the provision of incentives ex ante. 
In our model, acting upon information obtained in the first period means deciding 
about the second-period project which does not depend on the first-period effort. 
Our mechanism is that the second-period moral hazard rent makes the interim infor-
mation revelation more costly. While the mechanisms are different, the interaction 
of moral hazard and adverse selection is crucial in all three papers: each of them 
becomes trivial if only moral hazard or adverse selection is present.6
The paper is also related to the literatures on the role of collateral (see, e.g., Bester 
1985 and Besanko and Thakor 1987a) and relational lending (see, e.g., Sharpe 
1990 and Petersen and Rajan 1995) in facilitating access to credit. There are, how-
ever, important differences. The literature on collateral has typically focused on the 
availability of exogenously given amounts of collateral. In contrast, in our setting 
the value of collateral available in the second period of the relationship to separate 
borrowers is endogenous. The relational lending literature, instead, focuses on the 
effects of ex post competition from outside lenders but ignores the role of endoge-
nous savings and collateral. In our setting, ex post competition from outside lenders 
does affect the ability to finance the project despite the endogenous collateral that 
can be created through savings.
5 Other papers related to Bouvard (2012), such as Grenadier and Malenko (2011) and Morellec and Schürhoff 
(2011) are also mainly concerned how a better informed firm can signal its private information through the financial 
contracts it offers to investors.
6 In Crémer and Khalil (1992) and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998), the agent may become informed at a 
cost, and the principal adjusts the contract to provide the agent with optimal incentives for information acquisition. 
These papers (as well as Levitt and Snyder 1997 and Inderst and Mueller 2010), however, are essentially static and 
do not consider the intertemporal trade-offs involved. Other models mixing moral hazard and adverse selection are 
discussed in, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (2002, chapter 7) and Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, chapter 6.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model with 
a unique project size. Section II introduces the extension with two project sizes 
and derives the results on the effects of the discount factor and the outside option. 
Section III studies the effects of competition and shows that a better agent, in the 
sense of lower expected effort costs, may find financing her project more difficult. 
Section IV explores robustness of the results to savings. Section V finds a realistic 
contract that replicates the direct mechanism of Section II, interprets microfinance 
contracts in the light of our model, and discusses testable implications. Section VI 
concludes. The proofs are in the Mathematical Appendix.
I. The Model
A. setup
There is an agent that lives for two periods, τ = 1, 2. In each period the agent has 
the opportunity to undertake a project that needs an initial capital investment of 1 and 
yields return r when completed. A project that is not completed fails and yields 0.
The agent has no assets and needs to borrow one unit of capital in order to start 
the project. She is protected by limited liability. The agent and lenders have a com-
mon discount factor δ ∈  [ 0, 1 ] across the two periods. The complete description of 
the timing of events and the contracts is postponed until Section IC.
To complete the project the agent needs to appropriately invest the unit of capital 
and to exert effort. The agent can divert a share ψ ≤ 1 of the initial investment for 
private consumption. If she does so, the project fails. The parameter ψ reflects the 
difficulty for the lender of monitoring the investment and transaction costs in divert-
ing the investment.
There are two types of agent, good G and bad B, which remain constant over the 
two periods. The cost of effort for the good agent is  e G = 0, and  e B = e > 0 for the 
bad agent.7 Initially, both the agent and the lenders are uninformed about the type of 
agent and have a common prior ρ about the probability of the agent being the good 
type. The agent privately learns her type upon starting the project in period 1 but 
does not if she doesn’t start the project. After having learned her type, she decides 
whether to exert effort and whether to divert the capital.
Whenever effort is exerted and investment is not diverted, the project succeeds 
and yields r, which is observable and verifiable. In any period in which the agent 
does not undertake the project, she takes an outside option u > 0.
We make the following parametric assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1: r − 1 < u + e.
ASSUMPTION 2: u < ψ.
ASSUMPTION 3: max {1, e} < r − ψ.
7 The model can be also interpreted with the effort cost being a characteristic of the project, rather than of the 
agent.
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The first assumption implies that it is not optimal to invest if the agent is (known 
to be) bad: the opportunity costs of investment 1 + u are higher than revenues r net 
of effort costs e.
The second assumption implies that the agent always prefers to start the project 
with borrowed money rather than take her outside option u.
Finally, the third assumption has two implications. First, r − 1 > ψ implies that 
the project generates enough revenues to solve the moral hazard problem of the 
good type. Second, r > ψ + e implies that, once the project is started and the initial 
outlay of one unit of capital is sunk, it is optimal to complete the project regardless 
of the agent’s type.
B. optimal Experimentation by a self-financed Agent
Let us first consider the benchmark case in which the agent has enough wealth 
so that she does not need to borrow. In this case the agent is the residual claimant of 
the project: there are no incentive problems and, therefore, the first-best allocation 
is chosen.
Once she has started the project in period 1, the agent exerts effort and com-
pletes the project regardless of her type (Assumption 3). In period 2, she invests 
and completes the project again if she has learned that she is of the good type, since 
r − 1 > u. If she has learned that she is of the bad type she prefers to take her out-
side option (Assumption 1). Conditional on having started the project in period 1, 
this is the first-best allocation.
Investment in period 1 can be thought of as experimentation: its costs are borne 
in period 1 while the benefits are realized in period 2. After the agent has learned her 
type, she will be able to make an informed decision. The costs of experimentation are 
given by the difference between the opportunity cost u and the expected surplus cre-
ated by the project in period 1, i.e., r − 1 − (1 − ρ)e. The benefits of experimenta-
tion are due to better decision-making in period 2. With probability ρ, the information 
gathered through experimentation leads the agent to start a project, instead of taking 
the outside option. With probability 1 − ρ, instead, the agent learns she is of the bad 
type and takes her outside option. In this case, the information gathered through exper-
imentation does not change her decision.8 The value of information therefore equals 
δρ(r − 1 − u). Experimentation is optimal if its costs are lower than its benefits.
LEMMA 1: if the agent does not need to borrow, experimentation (investment in 
period 1) is optimal if and only if δ ≥  δ E , where
(1)   δ E ≡  u + e(1 − ρ) −  ( r − 1 )   __ ρ(r − 1 − u)  .
As in standard experimentation models, starting the project in period 1 becomes 
profitable if δ is high enough, if the agent is sufficiently confident about being of the 
8 The agent is considering whether to experiment or not in period 1. If she decides to not experiment in period 1, 
then she optimally does not experiment in period 2 either.
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good type (high ρ), if the value of the known activity is not too high (low u), and if 
the project yields high returns (high r − 1).
C. contracts and Timing of Events
We now describe contracts and the structure of the credit market. Lenders com-
pete in the market and make zero profits in expectation.9 They have full commit-
ment power and offer two-period contracts. The project is financed in period 1. For 
simplicity, we initially assume that (i) the agent cannot change her lender in period 2 
(but she can take her outside option u), (ii) the agent cannot save on her own. We 
relax these two assumptions in Section III and Section IV.
The timing of events is the following. Immediately after the agent learns her 
type, she sends message m ∈ {G, B} to the lender.10 According to the message, the 
contract specifies the agent’s actions in period 1, a transfer conditional on the project 
outcome in period 1 and a re-financing policy in period 2. The contract also specifies 
a transfer in period 2 conditional on project outcomes in periods 1 and 2. The timing 
of events is summarized in Figure 1.
We say that an allocation can be financed if there exists a contract that gives 
appropriate incentives to the agent and satisfies the lender’s zero-profit constraint. 
In the next section we analyze when a lender can finance the first-best allocation 
described above. In Section IE we show which allocation is financed if the first best 
is not possible.
D. financing the first Best
In this section we study when the first-best allocation, that is, the one chosen by 
a self-financed agent, is financed. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First, we find 
the cost-minimizing contract, that is, the contract that finances the first best with the 
least possible transfers. Second, we find for which parameter values this contract 
allows the lender to earn nonnegative profits.
To find the cost-minimizing contract we need to consider all the relevant incen-
tive compatibility, truth-telling, and limited liability constraints for the two types.11 
9 The main insights of the paper are preserved if the contract maximizes lender’s profits subject to the borrower 
incentive and participation constraints. See the discussion at the end of Section IE.
10 Since lenders have commitment power and contracts are exclusive, the Revelation Principle applies and we 
can focus on direct revelation mechanisms. We consider an indirect mechanism in Section V.
11 To keep exposition simple and avoid too much notation in the main text, we relegate to the Mathematical 
Appendix the formal exposition of all relevant constraints.
Figure 1. Timing of Events
Contracts
offered and
selected
A learns type
and reports it
t
A decides
on effort and
diversion
Period 1 Period 2
Investment
takes place
Project outcome
is realized and
transfers made
Investment
takes place
A decides
on effort and
diversion
Project outcome
is realized and
transfers made
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Remember that in the first-best allocation only the good type is refinanced in period 2 
but both types must complete the project in period 1. The following constraints, 
therefore, need to be satisfied. First, the good type must prefer to complete the proj-
ect in both period 1 and period 2. Second, the bad type must prefer to complete the 
project in period 1. Third, both types must have an incentive to reveal their type 
truthfully. Finally, the contract must satisfy all relevant limited liability constraints.
We first prove the following Lemma.
LEMMA 2: The net present value of the required minimum transfers to the good and 
bad types to implement the first best is given by
(2)   T G ∗ = ψ + e + δ u and  T B ∗ = ψ + e, 
respectively.
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
In period 1, the project should be completed independently of the type of agent 
since, at that stage, the initial outlay of one unit of capital is sunk (Assumption 3). 
Since the bad type is not given a project in period 2, the contract must give a transfer 
worth at least ψ + e to compensate for not stealing and for her effort cost. This, 
however, gives an incentive to the good type to pretend to be the bad type. Hence 
a minimum transfer of ψ + e, with an additional compensation for not taking the 
project in period 2, must be paid to the good type as well.
Are those transfers sufficient to satisfy the other constraints? It turns out they are. 
In principle, the good type also needs to be given incentives to complete the project 
in period 2. The minimum amount of rents necessary to induce the good type to 
complete the project in period 2 is equal to ψ. However, δ ≤ 1 implies that these 
rents are smaller than those required to induce the bad type to complete the project 
in period 1. Since rents to the good type can be paid in period 2, a contract that 
induces the good type to reveal her type truthfully pays sufficient rents to ensure the 
project in period 2 is completed.12 Conversely, the bad type does not want to pretend 
to be the good type and try to get a project in period 2.
The first best can be financed when the project revenues are large enough to pay 
the cost-minimizing transfers characterized in Lemma 2, i.e., when
   ( r − 1 )  ( 1 + δρ ) ≥ ρ T G ∗ +  ( 1 − ρ )  T B ∗ .
This expression can be rewritten as
(3)  δ ≥  δ _fB ≡  ψ + e −  ( r − 1 )   __ρ ( r − 1 − u )   .
12 This is similar to the “reusability of punishments” introduced by Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) accord-
ing to which one punishment can be used to provide incentives for the agent to exert effort over many periods.
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This leads to the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: The first-best allocation is financed if and only if δ ≥  δ _fB .
Threshold  δ _fB is higher than the one of the self-financing agent,  δ E in (1). Incentive 
problems create rents that make experimentation more expensive but do not change 
the nature of the problem. Comparative statics on  δ _fB are similar to the one on  δ E : 
experimentation is more likely to be financed for more optimistic priors ρ, higher 
discount factor δ, higher project profits r − 1 and for lower values of the outside 
option u, effort costs e and the share of funds that can be diverted, ψ.
E. financing the second Best
The first-best allocation cannot be financed for every configuration of parameters 
in which experimentation is profitable. The reason is that inducing the bad type to 
complete the first-period project requires paying informational rents to the good type 
as well, and this might be too costly if the bad type is very unlikely. The borrower 
and the lender may then agree on a contract that let the bad type fail in period 1 and 
finances the project in period 2 conditional on the successful completion of the project 
in period 1. In other words, as in standard adverse selection models, the lender may 
shut down the bad type if its probability is low enough. The contract then only needs to 
solve the moral hazard problem of the good type. This is the second-best allocation.13
The good type has to be incentivized to complete the project in period 1, which 
requires a transfer worth at least ψ + δ u. Since δ ≤ 1, these rents are sufficient to 
also ensure that the good type completes the project in period 2, which requires a 
transfer worth δ ψ. The bad type, on the other hand, does not require any transfer 
since she does not complete the project in period 1 and then takes her outside option 
in period 2.
The second best, therefore, can be financed when the project revenues are larger 
than the transfers required to induce the good type to repay in both periods, i.e.,
  ρr − 1 + δρ  ( r − 1 ) ≥ ρ  ( ψ + δ u ) .
This expression can be rewritten as
(4)  δ ≥  δ sB ≡  1 − ρ ( r − ψ )   __ρ ( r − 1 − u )  .
The comparative statics follows the standard logic: a higher δ, a higher ρ, and a lower 
u expand the region in which the second best can be financed. The next proposition 
characterizes the region where the second best is financed and Figure 2 illustrates it.
13 The contract could implement the allocation in which the bad type receives a project in the second period 
as well. It is easy to show, however, that the first best can be financed whenever this allocation can be financed, 
and, therefore, inefficient continuation of projects in period 2 does not occur in equilibrium. A previous version of 
the paper showed that, with more than two types, inefficient continuation can be part of the constrained optimal 
contract.
324 AMEricAn EconoMic JoUrnAL: MicroEconoMics fEBrUAry 2014
PROPOSITION 2: The second-best allocation is financed if and only if
   δ _sB ≤ δ <  δ _fB .
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
A monopolistic lender which maximizes profits subject to the agent participation 
and incentive compatibility constraints trades off efficiency and rents. In particular, 
for ρ and δ such that δ =  δ _fB and δ >  δ _sB the lender’s profits from financing the first-
best allocation are zero (by construction) while financing the second-best allocation 
yields positive profits. A monopolistic lender then chooses the  second-best alloca-
tion. The region where the first-best allocation is financed shrinks while the one of 
the second-best allocation expands. However, comparative statics with respect to δ, 
ρ, and u are qualitatively preserved.
II. Starting Small
In many contexts, an agent might decide to experiment by “starting small” and 
then later to scale up the project if she learns that the activity is profitable. In our 
context, “starting small” has the additional advantage that it might reduce the infor-
mational rents that must be paid to the agent to reveal her type and exert effort. 
In this section, we show that allowing the agent to “start small” generates novel 
Figure 2. Financed Allocations for r = 1.7, u = 0.15, ψ = 0.4, e = 0.61, and σ = 0.15. 
At  ρ w =  1 + σ ( r − 1 − e )   __r − σe the Welfare in the Second-Best Allocation  
Equals the One in the First-Best Allocation when Starting Small
1
0 0.4 1
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implications that are qualitatively different from the results obtained in the previous 
section: experimentation might become harder to finance when it is more profitable.
We now assume that a small project is also available. The small project is a pro-
portionally scaled down version of the project studied above (that we will call a 
large project for clarity). Specifically, the small project yields revenues σ r, costs an 
initial investment equal to σ (and so σ ψ can be diverted) and requires effort costs σ e 
from the bad type. Starting the small project still perfectly reveals the agent’s type.
As a benchmark, consider a self-financed agent.
LEMMA 3: A self-financed agent never implements the small project.
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
In order to avoid a lengthy taxonomy of cases we make an additional assumption:
ASSUMPTION 4:  u _ ψ + e < σ <  u _ r − 1 .
The assumption σ <  u _ r − 1 implies that a small project is per se unprofitable: 
the only reason to undertake a small project is to learn the type of the agent. The 
assumption, therefore, rules out cases in which the small project is financed in both 
periods. The assumption σ >  u _ ψ + e ensures the agent’s participation in the project.
Assumption 4 implies that we can restrict attention to four allocations. Two allo-
cations we considered above in which a large project is financed in period 1, that is, 
the first best of Section ID and the second best of Section IE. Two new allocations 
are the ones in which a small project is financed in period 1 and is either completed 
or not, and the large project is financed in period 2 is the agent is of the good type. 
For clarity, we refer to those allocations as first best when starting small and second 
best when starting small.14
Let us find out the conditions under which financing the first best when starting 
small is possible. As in Section ID, we again proceed in two steps. First, we find the 
contract that finances the allocation with the least possible transfers. This is the next 
Lemma. Second, we find for which parameter values this contract allows the lender 
to earn nonnegative profits.
LEMMA 4: Define  δ ∗ = σ ψ + e _ψ − u  . The net present value of the required minimum 
transfers to the good and bad types to implement the first best when starting small 
is given by
(5)  {  T G s = σ ( ψ + e ) + δ u   T B s = σ ( ψ + e )   , if δ ≤  δ ∗ and   {  T G s = δ ψ    T B s = δ ( ψ − u )  , if δ >  δ ∗ .
14 Analogously to footnote 13, it is easy to show that the bad type is never given a small project in period 2. If 
this is feasible, then it is also feasible to provide incentives to efficiently terminate the project.
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PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
The small project of period 1 should be completed independently of the type of 
agent. Since the bad type is not given a project in period 2, the contract must give 
a transfer worth at least σ ( ψ + e ) to compensate for not stealing and for her effort 
cost. This gives an incentive to the good type to pretend to be the bad type.
In contrast to the case in which the project has the same size in both periods, 
however, these transfers may not be sufficient to satisfy other constraints. If δ ψ > 
σ ( ψ + e ) + δ u, the bad type is tempted to pretend to be the good type, get a project 
in period 2, and to run with the money. Which constraint binds, therefore, depends on 
whether δ ψ ≷ σ ( ψ + e ) + δ u, i.e., δ ≷  δ ∗ , as described in Lemma 4. Note that this 
inequality can be rewritten as  σ _ δ ≷  ψ − u _ψ + e  . It is then clear that there is a  one-to-one cor-
respondence between the discount factor δ and scale σ, i.e., what matters is the weight, 
in present value terms, of the first-period rent relative to the second-period rent.
If σ ≥  ψ − u _ψ + e  the first-period rents determine the costs of implementing any given 
allocation and, therefore, the analysis proceeds as in Section I with the first-period 
project rescaled by factor σ. If, instead, σ <  ψ − u _ψ + e  the analysis might change. In the 
reminder of the paper, we focus on this case.
ASSUMPTION 5: σ <  ψ − u _ψ + e  .15
The first best when starting small can be financed when the project revenues 
are large enough to pay the cost-minimizing transfers characterized in Lemma 4, 
that is,  ( r − 1 ) ( σ + δρ ) ≥ ρ T G s +  ( 1 − ρ )  T B s. If δ ≤  δ ∗ , this expression can be 
rewritten as
(6)  δ ≥  δ _s fB ≡ σ  ψ + e −  ( r − 1 )   __ρ ( r − 1 − u )   .
If δ >  δ ∗ , this expression can be rewritten as
(7)  δ ≤  _ δ s fB ≡  {  σ  r − 1  __  (1 − ρ) ( ψ − u ) − ρ(r − 1 − ψ)    1  if   ρ ≤   ( ψ − u ) − σ ( r − 1 )   __ r − 1 − u     otherwise  .
This leads to the following proposition. Define
(8)   ρ ∗ =  ( 1 −  r − 1 _ψ + e  )  ψ − u _ r − 1 − u ,
so the curves  δ _s fB and  _ δ s fB intersect at  ( ρ ∗ ,  δ ∗ ) .
15 As a consequence of this and Assumption 4, ψ > 2u.
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PROPOSITION 3:
 (i) first best when starting small can be financed if and only if  δ _s fB ≤ δ ≤  _ δ s fB .
(ii)  There is a region where the first best when starting small is financed. in par-
ticular, it is financed at  ( ρ ∗ ,  δ ∗ ) .
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
For the proof of part (ii) we show that at  ( ρ ∗ ,  δ ∗ ) neither the first best nor the 
 second-best allocations in which the large project is financed in period 1 are pos-
sible. In Figure 2 we draw a numerical example showing where each allocation is 
financed.16
Constraint (6) is very similar to (1) and (3): for low enough δ the profits earned in 
period 2 can be used to finance the agent’s rent that must be paid to complete the proj-
ect. When δ is sufficiently high, however, the bad type is tempted to “take the money 
and run” in period 2, that is, the truth-telling constraint of the bad type may become 
binding. In period 2, the lender needs to pay ψ − u to prevent the bad type from 
obtaining a project. The lender faces a deficit of (1 − ρ) ( ψ − u ) − ρ(r − 1 − ψ) 
which has to be financed by the first-period profits σ ( r − 1 ) . A higher δ, therefore, 
reduces the value of period 1 profits relative to the second-period deficit and makes 
it harder to finance experimentation. Thus, the direction of (7), that δ has to be below 
a certain threshold, is the opposite to the direction of (1), (3), and (6).17
While it is generally perceived that future rents associated with a project are 
helpful to solve moral hazard (see, e.g., Rogerson 1985; and Bolton and Scharfstein 
1990), this paper shows that under initial uncertainty about these rents, they might 
attract undesirable borrowers and, therefore, lower the ex ante borrowing capacity. 
Interestingly, these rents are increasing in the net present value of the project, imply-
ing that more profitable projects might be harder to finance.
The logic is illustrated by the comparative statics with respect to the discount fac-
tor δ, the outside option u and the scale σ. If δ ≤  δ ∗ , a higher δ expands the interval 
of values of ρ for which the first best when starting small can be financed. If δ >  δ ∗ , 
a higher δ shrinks this interval. Similarly, the comparative statics with respect to 
the outside option u is nonmonotonic. When δ ≤  δ ∗ , a higher u reduces the costs 
of being denied access to credit in period 2. This shifts  δ _s fB upwards (see (6)) and, 
hence, shrinks the region in which financing the first best when starting small is 
possible. When δ >  δ ∗ , a higher u reduces the rent needed to keep the bad type out 
in period 2. This shifts  
_ δ s fB upwards (see (7)) and expands the region where financ-
ing the first best when starting small is possible. Thus, in contrast to the case of a 
self-financed agent (1) and the first best (3), a higher outside option makes lending 
16 For completeness, we derive in the Mathematical Appendix the region where the second best when starting 
small can be financed (see Proposition 8).
17 A useful analogy is dynamic adverse selection models without commitment (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole 
1987, 1988) in which the principal pays a high rent to the good type which then attracts the bad type (ratchet effect). 
In contrast, here the lender can commit to a two-period contract and the source of the rent is the possibility of divert-
ing the investment in period 2.
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easier. Analogously, a lower σ facilitates financing for δ ≤  δ ∗ (see (6)) and hampers 
it for δ >  δ ∗ (see (7)). The latter point implies that the agency problem puts a lower 
bound on the downsizing of the experimentation round. The remaining comparative 
statics, however, have the expected sign.
We then summarize the discussion by its corollary.
COROLLARY 1: There exists a region in the space  ( ρ, δ ) where the first best when 
starting small is financed and which shrinks with a lower u and where a higher δ 
requires a higher ρ. in that region, a higher value of experimentation makes financ-
ing it more difficult.
III. Ex Post Competition
In Sections I and II, we have considered the case in which the borrower cannot 
seek finance from outside lenders in period 2. This section relaxes this assumption. 
The section has two goals: (i) check the robustness of the main result in Section II to 
the presence of ex post competition, and (ii) derive additional results on the relation-
ship between competition, value of the project, and financing constraints.
We follow the relational lending literature (see, e.g., Sharpe 1990) and assume 
that outside lenders do not observe the communication between the inside lender 
and the borrower but can observe the first-period outcome of the project. We then 
consider two different scenarios, depending on whether the original lender can 
enforce loan contracts that are contingent on whether the borrower takes outside 
finance from an alternative lender (for simplicity, contingent contract case) or not 
(noncontingent contract case). Both scenarios are likely to be relevant depending on 
the context. For example, Barney et al. (1994) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) 
find that venture capital contracts commonly include “noncompete” and “vesting 
provision” clauses that make it harder for the entrepreneur to hold-up the venture 
capitalist. In other contexts, however, lenders do not have the ability to condition 
the terms of their relationship with borrowers on whether borrowers access other 
sources of finance following the termination of their relationship. An example of 
such a circumstance is (micro)credit to small, typically informal, microenterprises 
in developing countries (see, e.g., McIntosh and Wydick 2005; and Karlan and 
Morduch 2010 for a discussion). Even in countries with developed financial sys-
tems, the type of hold-up we consider prominently features in discussions of bank 
finance to SMEs (see, e.g., Harhoff and Körting 1998; Berger and Udell 2006; and 
Ioannidou and Ongena 2010).
The exact effects of competition depend on the contracts that the inside lender can 
offer. With contingent contracts the inside lender counteracts outside lenders’ offers 
successfully and, therefore, competition in period 2 has no effect (Proposition 4) on 
the results. With noncontingent contracts, instead, competition qualitatively changes 
the results. In particular, the first-best allocation cannot be financed at all. Moreover, 
a higher probability of the good type, ρ, may have a negative effect on the possibility 
to finance experimentation (Proposition 5). Albeit along a different dimension, the 
result confirms the main finding in Section II that financing experimentation might 
become harder precisely when it is most valuable.
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Preliminary observations and robustness of the result in section ii.—In the first 
best both types complete the project in period 1 and, therefore, outside lenders do not 
know the type of the agent that applies to them. As outside lenders have one-period 
relationship with the agent, they cannot finance the small project (Assumption 4) 
and they have to let the bad type fail (Assumption 2 and 3). Then, they prefer to pay 
ψ − u to the agent who reports to be of the bad type rather than finance the project 
that costs one (this can be done, e.g., by giving a small loan). Thus, outside lenders 
free ride on the information generated by the inside lender.
Competition between outside lenders makes them pay the highest possible rent 
to the good type driving their profits to zero. The inside lender, however, always 
structures a contract that gives incentives to the bad type to seek funds from outside 
lenders as this makes it harder for outside lenders to compete. The highest rent 
outside lenders can pay to good type while still breaking even in expected terms is 
therefore given by r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ  ( ψ − u ) . This rent has to be above ψ for the agent 
to complete the project, i.e.,
(9)  ρ >  ρ comp ≡  ψ − u _ 
r − 1 − u 
is necessary for the outside lenders to be able to offer loans in period 2. For ρ ≤ 
ρ comp outside lenders are unable to attract the good type without making losses. 
When this is the case, the conditions for implementing all the allocations are the 
same as in Sections I and II. Since  ρ ∗ , defined in (8), is smaller than  ρ comp , there 
always exists a region where the first best when starting small is financed and where 
the comparative statics are as described in Corollary 1.
COROLLARY 2: There exists a region in which the comparative statics described 
in corollary 1 holds when there is ex post competition from outside lenders.
A. competition with contingent contracts
We begin by considering the case in which the lender can offer contracts that are 
contingent on whether the borrower completes, fails, or does not take up a project 
financed by an outside lender.
PROPOSITION 4: When the inside lender can write contingent contracts, ex post 
competition does not bite. The regions in which each allocation can be financed are 
as characterized in Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 8.
Proposition 4 can be easily proven by construction. In particular, consider 
any contract that implements the desired allocation in the absence of ex post 
competition. To respond to ex post competition, the inside lender has to include 
in that contract the following “vesting provision”: the borrower has the option 
to purchase the right to continue the project in period 2 at a price f. To exer-
cise the option, the borrower needs to borrow 1 + f from the outside lender. A 
price f > r − 1 − ψ is sufficient to ensure that there does not exist a contract in 
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which (i) the borrower obtains sufficient funds, invests and repays the loan, and 
(ii) the outside lender makes nonnegative profits (see Aghion and Bolton 1987) 
for a similar logic).
B. competition with noncontingent contracts
We now consider the case in which the lender cannot write contracts contingent 
on what the borrower does upon leaving the relationship in period 2. We focus on 
the case when ρ >  ρ comp , i.e., when competition from outside lenders is possible.
PROPOSITION 5: Under competition from outside lenders with noncontingent 
contracts,
 (i)  the first best cannot be financed,
 (ii)  the first best when starting small can be financed if  δ _comp 
≡ σ  ψ + e −  ( r − 1 )   __ ( 1 − ρ )  ( ψ − u )   ≤ δ ≤ σ  r − 1 _ ρ ( ψ − u )  ≡  
_ δ comp , and
 (iii)  the region in which the second best can be financed is as in Proposition 2.18
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates the Proposition through an example. Proposition 5 contains 
two main results. First, the first best is impossible to finance (part (i)). This happens 
because the second-period profits of the inside lender, which are limited by competi-
tion to δ ( 1 − ρ )  ( ψ − u ) , are not sufficient to compensate for his first-period loss 
of ψ + e −  ( r − 1 ) .
More importantly, Proposition 5 shows that a higher ρ is detrimental to the financ-
ing of experimentation (part (ii)). Since  δ _comp increases in ρ while  _ δ comp decreases 
in ρ, a higher ρ makes financing the first best when starting small more difficult. A 
higher ρ might make the first best when starting small impossible to finance while 
no other allocation can be financed either. The intuition for these results is that out-
side lenders “bite the hand that feeds them.” Attracting the good type, they increase 
the inside lender’s costs. A higher ρ allows outside lenders pay a higher rent to the 
good type to a point that cannot be matched by the inside lender, who also bears the 
costs of experimentation. But without the information generated by the first period 
financing, outside lenders cannot survive for some intermediate values of ρ and, 
therefore, the market completely shuts down.
Finally, if outside lenders believe that only bad types do not complete period 1 
projects (second-best allocations), the good type can no longer pretend to be the bad 
type without losing access to outside lenders in period 2. The bad type does not get 
any transfer and all transfers to the good type can be paid upon successful comple-
tion of both projects. Whether the region in which a second-best allocation can be 
18 For completeness, we also show that the region in which the second best when starting small can be financed 
shrinks relative to the characterization in Proposition 8 in the Mathematical Appendix.
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financed is affected by competition or not, then, simply depends on whether the rent 
paid by outside lenders to the good type in period 2, i.e., δ ( r − 1 ) , is larger than the 
rent necessary to have the project completed in both period under no competition. 
In the second best, it turns out it is not: the inside lender is in any case paying high 
rents to complete a large project in period 1.
IV. Savings
This section shows that the main results derived in Section II and Section III 
are robust if the borrower can (partially) self-finance the period 2 project through 
endogenous savings acquired in period 1.
The good type, in particular, may prefer to divert ψ in period 1, self-finance the 
project in period 2 and obtain returns r − 1. If diverting ψ in period 1 is not enough 
to self-finance the project in period 2, the agent may apply to outside lenders when 
they are available. For simplicity, we assume a costless saving technology for the 
agent. The agent earns an interest rate 1 + i =  1 _ δ on her private savings: if the agent 
saves s in period 1 her savings are worth s(1 + i) =  s _ δ in period 2.
We first study the case when there are no outside lenders. When a large project is 
financed in period 1, self-financing is then possible if  ψ _ δ ≥ 1. With the small project 
financed in period 1, the condition is  σ ψ _δ  ≥ 1. The next proposition shows that the 
Figure 3. Financed Allocations under Competition with Noncontingent Contracts 
for r = 1.7, u = 0.15, ψ = 0.4, e = 0.61, and σ = 0.15. At  ρ w =  1 + σ ( r − 1 − e )   __r − σe  
the Welfare in the Second-Best Allocation Equals the One  
in the First-Best Allocation when Starting Small
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possibility to save and self-finance in period 2 does not matter in the first-best allo-
cations but does matter in the second-best allocations.
PROPOSITION 6: When the agent can save on her own and there are no outside 
lenders:
 (i) The regions where the first best and the first best when starting small can be 
financed are as characterized in section ii.
 (ii) The second best cannot be financed for δ ≤ ψ and ρ <  1 _ 
r − ψ ; the second 
best when starting small cannot be financed if δ ≤ σ ψ and ρ <  1 _ 
r − ψ .19
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
When the agent completes the project in period 1 she gets a high rent that makes 
her prefer to stay with the lender rather than divert the first-period funding and 
 self-finance. Consider the first best when starting small. The good type gets at 
least σ ( ψ + e ) + δ u when staying with the lender if both projects are success-
ful. Diverting ψ and self-financing she gets σ ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) . The condition δ ≤ σ ψ 
(which is necessary for self-finance to be possible) then implies that the value of 
self-finance is always smaller than the rents obtained by completing the project. The 
same argument applies for the first best (replacing σ by 1).
In the second-best allocations, in contrast, the agent gets a smaller rent since she 
does not complete the first project. Getting ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) (or σ ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) ) by 
self-financing is better than the minimum transfer ψ + δ u (or σ ψ + δ u). Thus, the 
lender has to increase her transfer and the possibility of savings shrinks the region 
in which the second-best allocations can be financed.20
We now turn to the case in which the agent can save and there are outside lenders 
from whom she might borrow if her savings are not enough to finance the project. 
We characterize when the first-best allocations can be financed focusing on the case 
of noncontingent contracts.
PROPOSITION 7: When the agent can save and borrow from outside lenders under 
noncontingent contracts,
 (i) The first best cannot be financed,
 (ii) The first best when starting small cannot be financed if δ ≤ σ ψ _ ψ − u . for δ > σ ψ _ ψ − u , there exist thresholds  δ _ sav comp >  δ _comp ,  
_ δ sav comp <  _ δ comp and  ρ sav comp < 
ρ comp such that: (a) if ρ ≤  ρ sav comp the characterization in Proposition 3 applies, 
19 Otherwise, the second best can be financed as characterized in Proposition 2 and the second best when starting 
small can be financed as characterized in the proof of Proposition 8 in the Mathematical Appendix.
20 In our model, the possibility to save and self-finance only makes financing experimentation harder. The reason 
is that financing decision in period 2 is always efficient. In the models built on Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), where 
inefficient termination is used in the equilibrium, saving and self-financing has an efficiency benefit allowing the 
agent to continue when the lender would terminate as, for example, in Inderst and Mueller (2003).
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and (b) if ρ >  ρ sav comp the first best when starting small can be financed if 
δ _ sav comp ≤ δ ≤  _ δ sav comp .21
PROOF: 
See the Mathematical Appendix.
The main message of Proposition 7 is that the borrower’s ability to save and bor-
row from outside lenders interact to make lending even more difficult. The interaction 
stems from the fact that outside lenders can separate types at a lower cost. In particular, 
the constraint that the rent of the good type has to be at least ψ can be satisfied more 
easily since outside lenders invest less into the project and pay less to the bad type.
If the agent can save more than δ ( ψ − u ) , outside lenders can separate types at no 
cost since the bad type does not try to obtain funds from outside lenders and to divert 
ψ in period 2. Only the good type then applies for the loan and gets all the project 
rent r − 1. If the inside lender matches this rent to keep the good type, he does not 
make any profit in period 2. When the agent cannot save that much, the bad type 
also wants to apply for the loan from outside lenders and the analysis is then similar 
to the one of competition without savings as in Section IIIA. In particular, a higher 
ρ still makes financing the first best when starting small more difficult (i.e.,  δ _ sav comp 
increases with ρ while  _ δ sav comp decreases with ρ).
We summarize this discussion noting
COROLLARY 3: The results in section ii and section iii are qualitatively robust 
to the case in which the borrower has access to a saving technology. in particular, 
there always exist regions in the space  ( ρ, δ ) where (i) the first best when starting 
small is financed and which shrinks with a lower u and where a higher δ requires a 
higher ρ; (ii ) a higher ρ makes financing impossible. in these regions, a higher value 
of experimentation makes financing it more difficult.
V. Indirect Mechanism
We have investigated so far which allocations, if any, can be financed. It is impor-
tant, however, to know whether there are realistic contracts that replicate the direct 
mechanism that implements a given allocation and to derive testable implications. 
This section answers both questions. We consider only the first best when starting 
small as in Section II to keep the paper at a reasonable length.
Due to the agent’s risk neutrality, the structure of payments in the optimal con-
tract is not uniquely determined. To choose a particular contract, we impose a “mini-
mum consumption spread” refinement. Among all the contracts that implement the 
first best when starting small, we focus on those that minimize (i) the difference in 
the net present value of consumption across types, and (ii) the difference in con-
sumption across periods for each type.22
21 The results for the second-best allocations are omitted and available from the authors upon request.
22 Essentially, we assume that the agent has a utility function which is concave in consumption and separable 
in effort and consumption, i.e., U ( c ) − e, with  U ′ ( · ) > 0 and  U ″ ( · ) < 0, and then take the limit when U( · ) 
converges pointwise to the linear function c − e.
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Denote by  c τ i , i = G, B, τ = 1, 2, the consumption of type i in period τ. We pro-
ceed in three steps. First, we derive the net present value of consumption given to 
each type. Second, we derive the consumption allocation to each type in each period 
taking into account necessary incentive constraints. Finally, we describe a contract 
that induces the resulting consumption allocation.
Denote by Π the difference between the expected project revenues of the relation-
ship and the minimum transfers necessary to implement the first best when starting 
small,  T G s and  T B s (characterized in Lemma 4):
  Π =  ( σ + δρ ) (r − 1) −  [ ρ T G s +  ( 1 − ρ )  T B s ] .
The project can be financed if Π ≥ 0. Remember that  T G s =  T B s + δ u. We can 
rewrite
  Π =  ( σ + δρ ) (r − 1) +  ( 1 − ρ ) δ u −  T G s .
Since  T G s >  ( 1 + δ ) u, it follows that, if the project can be financed, the lender 
can design a contract in which the constraint  c 2 B ≥ u (which would stem from the 
 nontransferability of u) never bites. Transferable revenues,  ( σ + δρ ) (r − 1), and 
nontransferable payoffs,  ( 1 − ρ ) δ u, generated by the relationship can be aggre-
gated and competition among lenders ensures that the net present value of consump-
tion for each type is equal to c(ρ) =  ( σ + δρ ) (r − 1) + δ ( 1 − ρ ) u.23
Contracts satisfying the “minimum consumption spread” refinement implement 
the following consumption allocation:
 (i) Perfect consumption smoothing across types,  c 1 B  +  δ c 2 B  =   c 1 G   +  δ c 2 G = c(ρ).
 (ii) Perfect consumption smoothing across periods for the bad type,  c 1 B
=  c 2 B =  c(ρ) _1 + δ  > u.
 (iii) Perfect consumption smoothing for the good type  c 1 G =  c 2 G =  c(ρ) _1 + δ  if 
c(ρ) ≥ (1 + δ)ψ. Otherwise,  c 1 G = c(ρ) − δ ψ <  c 2 G = ψ.
The optimal contract provides full consumption insurance to the borrower 
against bad realizations of her entrepreneurial talent. The contract also provides 
perfect consumption smoothing across the two periods for the bad type since, condi-
tional on completing the project in period 1, no further constraint must be satisfied. 
Furthermore, in each period the bad type consumes more than her outside option u. 
The contract, however, might fail to achieve perfect consumption smoothing for the 
good type. Indeed, since the good type has to obtain at least ψ in period 2 to com-
plete the project, perfect consumption smoothing is possible only if ψ can also be 
paid in period 1, i.e., if c(ρ) ≥ (1 + δ)ψ.
23 We derive testable predictions by considering correlation patterns driven by heterogeneity in ρ across borrow-
ers. For expositional purposes, we omit other parameters entering c( · ).
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An optimal contract: Application to Microfinance.—Is there an indirect mech-
anism that implements the consumption allocation described above and resem-
bles a real world contract? As an example, consider the contract  ≡ { d 1 ,  d 2 ,  s c , i} 
defined as follows. The agent borrows σ in the beginning of period 1. If the proj-
ect yields revenue σ r, the agent repays  d 1 at the end of period 1. The borrower 
can apply and obtain funding in period 2 under two conditions: (i) she has repaid 
period 1 loan, and (ii) she posts collateral at least equal to  s c . If the borrower 
seeks and obtains funding in period 2, she borrows one unit of capital and repays 
d 2 if the project yields revenue r. Otherwise, she defaults and loses the posted col-
lateral. Finally, i is the interest rate paid by the lender on the saving account held 
by the borrower.
Denote by  s B and  s G the saving chosen by the bad type and good type, respec-
tively. Consumption patterns are then defined by
(10)   c 1 G = σ r −  d 1 −  s G and  c 1 B = σ r −  d 1 −  s B in period 1, and
  c 2 G = r −  d 2 + (1 + i) s G and  c 2 B = (1 + i) s B + u in period 2.
As in Section IV, let us set, with no loss of generality, (1 + i) =  1 _ δ . The remain-
ing terms of the contract can be computed substituting the appropriate consump-
tion values in (10). In period 2 the bad type consumes more than the income she 
derives from taking the outside option,  c 2 B =  c(ρ) _1 + δ  > u. The consumption in excess 
of income in period 2 gives a positive saving balance  s B (ρ) = δ ( c(ρ) _1 + δ  − u ) . 
Substituting into  c 1 B =  c(ρ) _1 + δ  , the amount to be repaid to the lender is equal to  d 1 (ρ) = σ r − c(ρ) + δ u, which is decreasing in ρ. 24 The model implies that better bor-
rowers consume (and save) more and receive better terms on the period 1 loan.
Substituting  d 1 (ρ) and the appropriate consumption values in (10), we find  s G (ρ) = max{δ  ( ψ − u ) ,  s B (ρ)}. In turn, this implies  d 2 = r − u. When c(ρ) < (1 + δ)ψ, 
the good type consumes less and saves more than the bad type in period 1.
Note that  s B (ρ) and  s G (ρ) are not part of the contract with the lender. Given  s B ( ρ ) 
and a requested collateral  s c , the bad type does not apply for a loan in period 2 (on 
which she would default) if
  ψ +   ( s 
B ( ρ ) −  s c ) 
  _δ  ≤  
c (ρ) _
1 + δ  ,
i.e., if  s c ≥ δ ( ψ − u ) . We saw this condition in Section IV (see discussion after 
Proposition 7), under which outside lenders can separate the types at no cost.
When c(ρ) ≥ (1 + δ)ψ, both types optimally save more than  s c but only the 
good type applies for a loan. When c(ρ) < (1 + δ)ψ, however, the bad type saves 
less than  s c . The good type, instead, is required to save  s c = δ ( ψ − u ) to obtain the 
24 The described contract is feasible if  d 1 ( ρ ) ≥ 0, i.e., if σ ≥ δρ ( r − 1 − u ) . The condition is verified, e.g., at ( δ ∗ ,  ρ ∗ ) defined in Lemma 4 and (8).
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loan. The optimal contract, therefore, requires the borrower to save a larger amount 
in order to continue borrowing in period 2.
The contract uses retained earnings to endogenously build up collateral and 
screen out the bad type. One way in which this can be achieved, is through compul-
sory saving requirements (CSRs). An example of a loan contract with compulsory 
saving requirements is found in microfinance, broadly defined as the provision of 
small uncollateralized loans to poor borrowers in developing countries. CSRs are 
a common feature of microcredit schemes (whenever the regulatory framework 
allows MFIs to collect deposits). For instance, the three largest microfinance insti-
tutions in Bangladesh (Grameen Bank, BRAC, and ASA) have been collecting 
compulsory regular savings from their clients from the very start of their programs 
(see, e.g., Dowla and Alamgir 2003). All of the five major microfinance institu-
tions described by Morduch (1999) use combinations of borrowing and saving. In 
recent years, many MFIs have also started offering more flexible savings products 
(see, e.g., Ashraf et al. 2003). CSRs are payments that are required for participation 
in the scheme, are part of loan terms, and are required in place of collateral. The 
amount, timing, and access to these deposits are determined by the policies of the 
institution rather than by the clients who are typically allowed to withdraw at the 
end of the loan term, after a predetermined amount of time, or when they terminate 
their membership.
When the second-best allocation is financed, CSRs are never needed. Indeed, 
the bad type reveals herself by defaulting in period 1. Therefore, the model implies 
that CSRs are more likely to be observed when the contract induces all borrowers 
to repay their loans. This suggests a connection between extremely high repayment 
rates and the prevalent use of CSRs observed in microfinance, as informally dis-
cussed in Morduch (1999).25
Empirical Predictions on the Use of collateral.—Besides rationalizing contrac-
tual features used in practice, the model yields a number of testable predictions on 
the relationship between collateral, loan terms, and project outcomes. Many models 
predict that lower risk borrowers pledge more collateral (see, e.g., Besanko and 
Thakor 1987a; Besanko and Thakor 1987b; Chan and Thakor 1987; and Chan and 
Kanatas 1985). This observation appears to be at odds with lending practices that 
associate the use of collateral with riskier borrowers (see, e.g., John, Lynch, and 
Puri 2003). In the model, the good type obtains the loan in period 2 and is required 
to post collateral worth  s c = δ ( ψ − u ) . Since the bad type never obtains a loan in 
period 2, the model implies no relationship between amount of collateral and risk in 
a cross section of period 2 borrowers.
Suppose the borrower has some wealth at time zero which can be posted, at 
some small variable cost, as collateral. This extension of the model does imply the 
observed empirical relationship between collateral and risk. If the borrower is credit 
25 The model can be applied to other contexts besides microcredit contracts. For example, the payment to the 
(bad type of ) borrower to make her relinquish the project can be interpreted as shift of the control from the entre-
preneur to the investor in venture capital finance. This can be implemented through a “purchase option”: when the 
investor exercises this option he effectively pays an exit fee to the entrepreneur (see, e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 
2003).
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constrained (i.e., cannot finance the first-best allocation) she would post the mini-
mum collateral necessary to obtain the loan. Since financing requirements are given 
while the surplus available is increasing in ρ, borrowers with lower ρ post higher 
collateral to obtain funds. In other words, in a cross section of borrowers, the model 
predicts a positive relationship between collateral posted and likelihood of termi-
nation (if a first-best type allocation is implemented) or likelihood of default (if a 
second-best type of allocation is implemented).26
VI. Conclusion
Exploration of unknown activities lies at the heart of this model. What happens 
when such activities are financed by a lender? The paper has shown that introduc-
ing agency problems changes the nature of experimentation. In particular, we have 
shown how, in the context of experimentation, projects with higher net present value 
can be systematically harder to finance. This might happen for higher discount fac-
tors, for lower values of the known arm and, in the presence of ex post competition, 
when priors are more optimistic about the unknown arm. We have highlighted the 
role of endogenous saving requirements in mitigating these problems and related the 
predictions of the model to contractual forms observed in practice and to a number 
of testable implications. A multi-period version of this model and the case of the 
lender’s imperfect commitment are left for future research.
Mathematical Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: 
In the end of period 1, the agent receives a transfer which is conditional on her 
report and first-period performance. Denote the first-period transfers as  t i,1  p 1 , where i 
is the reported type, i = G, B, and  p 1 is the first-period performance taking values s (success) and f (failure).
The second-period transfers are conditional on the entire history of the relation-
ship, that is, the agent’s report, her first-period performance and second-period 
performance if the project is funded in period 2. Denote the second-period transfers 
as  t B,2 p , when the bad type is reported, and  t G,2 p , when the good type is reported, where 
p is the performance in the two periods taking values ss (both successes), sf (success 
in period 1 and failure in period 2) and f (failure in period 1).
A contract consists of four first-period transfers,  t G,1 s ,  t G,1 f ,  t B,1 s ,  t B,1 f , five 
 second-period transfers,  t B,2 s ,  t B,2 f ,  t G,2 ss ,  t G,2 sf ,  t G,2 f and the rule that the second-period 
project is financed if and only if the reported type is “good” and there is success 
in period 1. Limited liability of the agent means that all the transfers have to be 
nonnegative.
26 As in standard models of moral hazard or adverse selection in credit market (see, e.g., Karlan and Zinman 
2010 for a discussion), the model also predicts that, conditional on the size of the loan, higher interest rates posi-
tively correlate with the likelihood of termination and default.
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The contract has to give incentives to report the truth and to complete the project 
in period 1 for both types and also to complete the project in period 2 for the good 
type. The incentive constraints for the good type are:
 t G,1 
s
 + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t G,1 f + ψ + δ  ( t G,2 f + u ) i c G,1 
 t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) T  T G 
 t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t B,1 f + ψ + δ  ( t B,2 f + u ) i c G,1 − T  T G 
 t G,2 ss ≥  t G,2 sf + ψ i c G,2 .
While the incentive constraints for the bad type are:
 t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t B,1 f + ψ + e + δ  ( t B,2 f + u ) i c B,1 
 t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t G,1 s + δ max  {  t G,2 ss − e,  t G,2 sf + ψ } T  T B 
 t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t G,1 f + ψ + e + δ  ( t G,2 f + u ) i c B,1 − T  T B .
For each type, constraints i c i,1 rule out failing the project in period 1 while 
reporting the type truthfully, constraints T  T i rule out lying while completing the 
project in period 1 and constraints i c i,1 − T  T i rule out the joint deviation of fail-
ing the project in period 1 and lying. Finally, constraint i c G,2 makes sure that 
the good type completes the project in period 2. Since financing the bad type in 
period 2 is off the equilibrium path, the contract may or may not give incentives 
to complete the project in period 2 for the bad type. That is why there is the term 
max{ t G,2 ss − e,  t G,2 sf + ψ} in the right-hand side of T  T B .
Note that the transfers after the failure in either the first or the second 
period enter only the right-hand sides of the constraints. Thus, the lender sets 
 t G,1 f =  t B,1 f =  t B,2 f =  t G,2 sf =  t G,2 f = 0. For the good type, rewrite the constraints:
 t G,1 
s
 + δ  t G,2 ss ≥ ψ + δ u i c G,1 
 t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) T  T G 
 t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥ ψ + δ u i c G,1 − T  T G 
 t G,2 ss ≥ ψ i c G,2 .
For the bad type, rewrite the constraints:
 t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥ ψ + e + δ u i c B,1 
 t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t G,1 s + δ max  {  t G,2 ss − e, ψ } T  T B 
 t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥ ψ + e + δ u i c B,1 − T  T B .
Note that if the project fails in period 1, the agent is not given the project in 
period 2 and, thus, her report does not matter. So, the constraints i c i,1 and i c i,1 − 
T  T i are identical for each type.
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To simplify notation, omit superscripts s and ss as this does not create any con-
fusion. Also, denote  T i =  t i,1 + δ  t i,2 the total transfer to each type. Rewrite the 
constraints
  T G ≥ ψ + δ u i c G,1 
  T G ≥  T B + δ u T  T G 
(A1)  t G,2 ≥ ψ i c G,2 
  T B + δ u ≥ ψ + e + δ u i c B,1 
  T B + δ u ≥  t G,1 + δ max{ t G,2 − e, ψ} T  T B .
From i c B,1 ,  T B ≥ ψ + e and, thus, T  T G implies i c G,1 .
It is easy to check that  T G = ψ + e + δ u (with  t G,2 = ψ > 0 and  t G,1 = ψ + e + δ u − δ ψ > 0) and  T B = ψ + e (split between  t B,1 ≥ 0 and  t B,2 ≥ 0 
in any way) satisfy the constraints T  T G , i c G,2 , i c B,1 , and T  T B as equalities and thus 
cannot be decreased.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
As in the analysis of the first best, we first find the cost-minimizing transfers and 
then we plug them into the lender’s zero-profit condition.
LEMMA 5: The net present value of the required minimum transfers to the good and 
bad types to implement the second best is given by
(A2)   T G sB = ψ + δ u  and   T B sB = 0, 
respectively.
PROOF: 
Since the good type completes the projects in period 1 while the bad type fails 
it, the project outcome in period 1 reveals the agent’s type and the lender does not 
have to ask for the report. Thus, the first-period transfers are conditional only on 
the outcome of the first-period project,  t 1 s and  t  1 f , and the second-period transfers 
are conditional on the first-period outcome and the second-period one if the second 
project is financed,  t 2 ss ,  t 2 s f , and  t 2 f .
A contract consists of five transfers,  t 1 s,  t  1 f ,  t 2 ss ,  t 2 s f , and  t  2 f and the rule that the 
second-period project is financed if and only if there is success in period 1. Limited 
liability of the agent means that all the transfers have to be nonnegative.
The contract has to give incentives to complete the projects in both periods for 
the good type and to fail the project in period 1 for the bad type. The incentive con-
straints are
   t 1 s + δ  t 2 ss ≥  t 1 f + ψ +  t 2 f + δ u i c G,1 
(A3)  t 1 f + ψ +  t 2 f + δ u ≥  t 1 s − e + δ max { t 2 ss − e,  t 2 sf + ψ} i c B,1 
  t 2 ss ≥  t 2 sf + ψ i c 2 .
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Since  t 2 sf enters only the right-hand side of the constraints,  t 2 sf = 0.
Denote  T G =  t 1 s + δ  t 2 ss the total transfer to the good type and  T B =  t 1 f + δ  t 2 f the 
total transfer to the bad type.
It is easy to check that  T G = ψ + δ u (with  t 2 ss = ψ > 0 and  t 1 s = ψ + δ u − δ ψ > 0) and  T B =  t 1 f =  t 2 f = 0 satisfy all the constraints.  T B cannot be made lower 
and, since i c G,1 is binding,  T G cannot be made lower either.
The revenues of the lender are ρr − 1 + δρ ( r − 1 ) . Plugging transfers (A2) into 
the zero-profit condition, we obtain condition (4). The second best is financed when 
(i) it is possible and (ii) the first best is not possible, that is, when  δ _sB ≤ δ <  δ _fB .
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: 
Since the scale of the project does not affect the learning process, the decision 
between “starting small” or “starting large” entirely depends on the comparison of the 
expected profits from the two technologies in period 1. If  ( r − 1 ) −  ( 1 − ρ ) e < 0, 
i.e., if ρ < 1 −  r − 1 _e  the small project is chosen. If, instead, ρ > 1 −  r − 1 _e  the 
large project is chosen. Analogously to the case in Section IB, the experimenta-
tion with the small project yields a higher payoff than the outside option if δ ≥ 
δ E s ≡  u + σ [ e(1 − ρ) −  ( r − 1 ) ]   __ ρ(r − 1 − u)  . At ρ = 1 −  r − 1 _e  , however,  δ E s > 1.27 Since  δ E s is 
decreasing in ρ, it follows that there does not exist values of ρ and δ for which 
experimenting with the small project is preferred to both the outside option and to 
experimenting with a large project.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: 
The proof closely follows the proof of Lemma 2.
A contract consists of four first-period transfers,  t G,1 s ,  t G,1 f ,  t B,1 s ,  t B,1 f , five 
 second-period transfers,  t B,2 s ,  t B,2 f ,  t G,2 ss ,  t G,2 sf ,  t G,2 f and the rule that the second-period 
project is financed if and only if the reported type is “good” and there is success in 
period 1 (the transfers are defined as in the proof of Lemma 2). Limited liability of 
the agent means that all the transfers have to be nonnegative.
The contract has to give incentives to report the truth and to complete the project 
in period 1 for both types and also to complete the project in period 2 for the good 
type. The incentive constraints for the good type are (see the proof of Lemma 2 for 
their description):
  t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t G,1 f + σ ψ + δ  ( t G,2 f + u ) i c G,1 
  t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) T  T G 
  t G,1 s + δ  t G,2 ss ≥  t B,1 f + σ ψ + δ  ( t B,2 f + u ) i c G,1 − T  T G 
  t G,2 ss ≥  t G,2 sf + σ ψ i c G,2 .
27 At ρ = 1 −  r − 1 _e  we have  δ E s =  e _ r − 1 − u  u _ e − (r − 1) . Assumption 3 implies eu > e ( e −  ( r − 1 ) ) > ( r − 1 − u )  ( e −  ( r − 1 ) ) .
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While the incentive constraints for the bad type are: 
  t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t B,1 f + σ ψ + σe + δ  ( t B,2 f + u ) i c B,1 
  t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t G,1 s + δ max  {  t G,2 ss − e,  t G,2 sf + ψ } T  T B 
  t B,1 s + δ  ( t B,2 s + u ) ≥  t G,1 f + σ ψ + σ e + δ  ( t G,2 f + u ) i c B,1 − T  T B .
Note that the transfers after the failure in either the first or the second 
period enter only the right-hand sides of the constraints. Thus, the lender sets 
 t G,1 f =  t B,1 f =  t B,2 f =  t G,2 sf =  t G,2 f = 0.
Then, the constraints i c i,1 and i c i,1 − T  T i are identical for each type since when 
the project fails in period 1, the agent is not given the project in period 2 and, thus, 
her report does not matter.
From i c B,1 ,  t B,1 s + δ t B,2 s ≥ σ ψ + σ e and, thus, T  T G implies i c G,1 .
Denote  T G s =  t 1 s + δ  t 2 ss the total transfer to the good type and  T B s =  t 1 f + δ  t 2 f the 
total transfer to the bad type.
The relevant constraints are then written as
   T G ≥  T B + δ u T  T G 
  t G,2 ≥ ψ i c G,2 
(A4)
  T B + δ u ≥ σ ψ + σ e + δ u i c B,1 
  T B + δ u ≥  t G,1 + δ max { t G,2 − e, ψ} T  T B .
If δ ≤  δ ∗ , then the transfers (2), adapted to the project being small in period 1, 
work. Indeed,  T G s = σ ψ + σ e + δ u (with  t G,2 = ψ > 0 and  t G,1 = σ ψ + σ e + δ u − δ ψ ≥ 0) and  T B s = σ ψ + σ e (split between  t B,1 ≥ 0 and  t B,2 ≥ 0 in any way) 
satisfy the constraints T  T G , i c G,2 , i c B,1 , and T  T B as equalities and thus cannot be 
decreased.
If δ  >   δ ∗ , transfers (2) become unfeasible since  t G,1   =  σ ψ  +  σ e  +  δ u  − δ ψ  <  0. The best the lender can do is then to set  t G,1   =  0 which implies 
 T G s  = δ ψ. From T  T B , he also sets  T B s  = δ ψ − δ u. Then, T  T G and T  T B are binding 
while i c B,1 is not.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
 (i) The double inequality  δ _s fB ≤ δ ≤  _ δ s fB is (6) and (7) combined.
 (ii) Let us show that financing the large project in period 1 is not possible at 
( ρ ∗ ,  δ ∗ ) . The first best is not possible since the curve  δ _s fB lies below  δ _fB . 
Indeed,  δ _s fB = σ  δ _fB <  δ _fB defined in (3). Thus, no point belonging to  δ _s fB 
can be financed in the first best.
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  For the second best, we show that  ρ ∗ lies to the left of  1  __   
r − ψ + σ  ψ + e _ψ − u   ( r − 1 − u ) 
 
which is  δ _sB defined in (4) at  δ ∗ . By Assumption 3, r − 1 − u > ψ − u. 
Then,
  ( r − ψ + u ) ( r − 1 − u ) >  ( r − ψ ) ( ψ − u ) 
 ⇔ r  ( r − 1 − u ) >  ( r − ψ + r − 1 − u ) ( ψ − u ) 
 ⇔  1 __ 
r − ψ + r − 1 − u >  
1 _ r  
ψ − u
  
r − 1 − u 
 ⇔  1 __ 
r − ψ + r − 1 − u >  ( 1 −  r − 1 _r  )  ψ − u _ r − 1 − u 
  ⇒  1  ___   
r − ψ + σ  ψ + e _ψ − u   ( r − 1 − u ) 
 >  ( 1 −  r − 1 _ψ + e  )  ψ − u _ r − 1 − u ,
where the last step uses the facts that σ  ψ + e _ψ − u  < 1 (Assumption 5) and r > ψ + e (Assumption 3).
Thus, at  ( ρ ∗ ,  δ ∗ ) neither the first best nor the second best are possible to finance 
and, therefore, the first best when starting small is financed. By continuity, there is 
a region around  ( ρ ∗ ,  δ ∗ ) and satisfying  δ _s fB ≤ δ ≤  _ δ s fB in which the first best when 
starting small is financed.
PROPOSITION 8: The second best when starting small can be financed in the fol-
lowing regions:
•	 if  δ _s sB ≡ max { σ  1 − ρ(r − ψ)  _ρ ( r − 1 − u )  , σ 1 − ρr _  ρ ( r − 1 − ψ )  } ≤ δ ≤  δ ∗ ;
•	 if  δ ∗ ≤ δ ≤ σ  ρr − 1 +  ( 1 − ρ )  ( ψ + e )   __  ( 1 − ρ )  ( ψ − u ) − ρ ( r − 1 − ψ )  if it is positive and for any δ ≥  δ ∗ 
otherwise.
PROOF: 
As in the analysis of the first best, we first find the cost-minimizing transfers and 
then we plug them into the lender’s zero-profit condition.
LEMMA 6: The net present value of the required minimum transfers to the good and 
bad types to implement the second best when starting small is given by
   {  T G = σ ψ + δ u   T B = 0  , if δ ≤  σ ψ _ ψ − u 
(A5)  {  T G = δ ψ  T B = 0  , if δ ∈  ( σ ψ _ ψ − u ,  δ ∗ ] 
  {  T G = δ ψ      T B = δ (ψ − u) − σ (ψ + e) , if δ >  δ ∗ .
VoL. 6 no. 1 343drugov and macchiavello: financing experimentation
PROOF: 
The proof closely follows the proof of Lemma 5. Since the good type completes 
the projects in period 1 while the bad type fails it, the project outcome in period 1 
reveals the agent’s type and the lender does not have to ask for the report. Thus, 
the first-period transfers are conditional only on the outcome of the first-period 
project,  t 1 s and  t 1 f , and the second-period transfers are conditional on the first-
period outcome and the second-period one if the second project is financed,  t 2 ss ,  t 2 sf , 
and  t 2 f .
A contract consists of five transfers,  t 1 s,  t 1 f ,  t 2 ss ,  t 2 sf , and  t 2 f and the rule that the 
 second-period project is financed if and only if there is success in period 1. Limited 
liability of the agent means that all the transfers have to be nonnegative.
The contract has to give incentives to complete the projects in both periods for 
the good type and to fail the project in period 1 for the bad type. The incentive con-
straints are
   t 1 s + δ  t 2 ss ≥  t 1 f + σ ψ +  t 2 f + δ u i c G,1 
  t 1 f + σ ψ +  t 2 f + δ u ≥  t 1 s − σ e + δ max { t 2 ss − e,  t 2 sf + ψ} i c B,1 
  t 2 ss ≥  t 2 sf + ψ i c 2 .
Since  t 2 sf enters only the right-hand side of the constraints,  t 2 sf = 0.
Denote  T G =  t 1 s + δ  t 2 ss the total transfer to the good type and  T B =  t 1 f + δ  t 2 f  
the total transfer to the bad type and rewrite the constraints as
  T G ≥  T B + σ ψ + δ u i c G,1 
(A6)  T B + σ ψ + δ u ≥  t 1 s − σ e + δ max{ t 2 ss − e, ψ} i c B,1 
  T 2 ss ≥ ψ i c 2 .
If δ ≤  σ ψ _ ψ − u ,  T G = σ ψ + δ u (with  t 2 ss = ψ > 0 and  t 1 s = σ ψ + δ u − δ ψ ≥ 0) 
and  T B =  t 1 f =  t 2 f = 0 satisfy all the constraints.  T B cannot be made lower and, 
since i c G,1 is binding,  T G cannot be made lower either.
If  σ ψ _ ψ − u < δ ≤  δ ∗ , σ ψ + δ u − δ ψ < 0, and so the lender sets  t 1 s = 0. 
Thus,  T G = δ ψ since  t 2 ss = ψ and  T B =  t 1 f =  t 2 f = 0. i c B,1 is satisfied since σ ψ + δ u ≥ δ ψ − σ e.
If δ >  δ ∗ , the lender still pays  T G = δ ψ to the good type. He also pays a positive 
transfer to the bad type to satisfy i c B,1 .  T B is then equal to δ ( ψ − u ) − σ ( ψ + e ) 
found from i c B,1 satisfied as equality.
Plugging transfers (A5) into the zero-profit condition σ ( ρr − 1 )   + 
δρ ( r − 1 )  ≥ ρ T G  +   ( 1 − ρ )  T B results in the regions described in the statement 
of the Proposition (the first two regions are joined to make it more concise).
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
(i) The first best: Outside lenders offer the rent of r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ  ( ψ − u ) to the 
good type.28 The inside lender has to counteract this since otherwise the good type 
leaves and the first best becomes impossible to finance.
Even though we consider the case of noncontingent transfers, the transfer to the 
good type in period 2 after two success,  t G,2 , is in fact contingent on the good type 
staying (and succeeding) with the inside lender.29 If she leaves the relationship, 
she then fails (or does not get) the project in period 2 and does not receive  t G,2 . The 
lender then sets  t G,1 = 0 and  t G,2 =   T G  _ δ and the new constraints, in addition (A1), are
   T G ≥ δ ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )  s G 
  T G ≥  T B + δ ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )  T T G −  s G 
  T B + δ  ( ψ − u ) + δ u ≥  T B + δ u  s B 
  T B + δ  ( ψ − u ) + δ u ≥ δ  ( ψ − u ) + δ u T  T B −  s B .
Constraint  s G ensures that the good type does not leave the relationship report-
ing the truth while T  T G −  s G ensures that she does not leave the relationship lying. 
Constraint  s B ensures that the bad type leaves the relationship if she reports the 
truth while T  T B −  s B ensures that she leaves the relationship not lying.30 Both con-
straints for the bad type are satisfied for any  T B and T  T G −  s G implies  s G . Then, set 
T B = ψ + e to give incentives for the bad type to complete the project in period 1 
(see the proof of Lemma 2) and  T G = ψ + e + δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) ) . 
Since  T G is higher than it was, we have to check T  T B :  T B + δ u ≥  t G,1 + δ max{ t G,2 − e, ψ} = δ max{ t G,2 − e, ψ} =  T G − δ e. As  T G increases in ρ, check for ρ = 1. The constraint becomes
  ψ + e + δ u ≥ ψ + e + δ  ( r − 1 − e ) ,
which holds since e + u > r − 1 (Assumption 1). It still does not matter how  T B is 
split between the two periods.
The zero-profit condition of the inside lender is then
  ( r − 1 ) ( 1 + δρ ) ≥ ρ  ( ψ + e + δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) ) ) 
 +  ( 1 − ρ ) ( ψ + e ) 
 ⇔ r − 1 ≥ ψ + e − δ  ( 1 − ρ ) ( ψ − u ) .
28 The transfer to the bad type does not depend on her actions in period 2. Thus, the bad type prefers to take 
ψ − u from an outside lender. Then, the outside lenders face probability ρ having the good type.
29 As in the proof of Lemma 2, it can be easily shown that all the transfers after any failure should be set to zero.
30 Assume that after the failure of the project in period 1 (which is off the equilibrium path), the outside lenders 
think that the agent is of the bad type and, therefore, do not deal with her.
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This condition is easier to satisfy for a higher δ and a lower ρ. However, it is not 
satisfied even for δ = 1 and ρ = 0 since r − 1 < e + u (Assumption 1). Thus, 
financing the first best is impossible for ρ >  ρ comp .
(ii) The first best when starting small: Let us first find the minimum transfers. In 
addition to constraints (A4), we have the following constraints:
   T G ≥  t G,1 + δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )  s G 
  T G ≥  T B + δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )  T T G −  s G 
  T B + δ  ( ψ − u ) + δ u ≥  T B + δ u  s B 
  T B + δ  ( ψ − u ) + δ u ≥ δ  ( ψ − u ) + δ u T  T B −  s B .
The inside lender sets  t G,1 = 0. Constraint T  T G −  s G implies then  s G and  s B and 
T  T B −  s B are always satisfied. Since r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ  ( ψ − u ) ≥ ψ for ρ ≥  ρ comp , 
T  T G −  s G implies T  T G and i c G,2 . Thus, we have the following constraints
   T G =  T B + δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )  T T G −  s G 
  T B ≥ σ  ( ψ + e ) i c B,1 
  T B + δ u ≥ max { T G − δ e, δ ψ} T  T B .
Since  T G is higher than it was, we need to check T  T B   :   T B   +  δ u  ≥ 
max{ T G − δ e, δ ψ}. If  T B   +  δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )   −  δ e  ≥  δ ψ, then T  T B   : 
 T B   +  δ u  ≥   T B   +  δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )   −  δ e and it is satisfied since 
δ u  ≥  δ  ( r − 1 )   −  δ e. If  T B   +  δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u ) )   −  δ e  ≤  δ ψ, then T  T B   : 
 T B   +  δ u  ≥  δ ψ as before. Thus, the minimum transfers are  T G   =   T B   + 
δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ  ( ψ − u ) ) and  T B   =  σ ( ψ + e ) if δ  ≤   δ ∗ and  T B   =  δ  ( ψ − u ) 
if δ ≥  δ ∗ .
Now, plugging these transfers into the zero-profit condition  ( r − 1 ) ( σ + δρ ) ≥ 
ρ  T G +  ( 1 − ρ ) T B yields the regions specified in the proposition.
(iii) The second best: Since the outside lenders observe the first-period out-
come, only the good type obtains a loan from outside lenders. Since they compete 
with each other, she gets all the rent, that is, r − 1. In the absence of competition, 
the inside lender pays at least  T G = ψ + δ u to the good type (see Section IE). Pay 
all this transfer in period 2, that is, after two successes. If the good type switches 
to an outside lender, she gets δ ( r − 1 ) < ψ + δ u. Thus, the good type does not 
switch under the original contract and competition from outside lenders does 
not matter.
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(iv) The second best when starting small: It can be financed in the following 
regions:
•	 If	σ  1 − ρ ( r − ψ )   _ρ ( r − 1 − u )  ≤ δ < σ  ψ _ r − 1 − u ,
•	 If	σ  ψ _ r − 1 − u ≤ δ ≤  δ ∗ and ρ >  1 _ r ,
•	 If		δ ∗ ≤ δ ≤ σ  ρr − 1 +  ( 1 − ρ ) (ψ + e) __  ( 1 − ρ ) (ψ − u)  .
Since the outside lenders observe the first-period outcome, only the good type 
obtains a loan from outside lenders. Since they compete with each other, she gets 
all the rent, that is, r − 1. Pay  T G entirely in period 2, that is, after two successes. 
The agent who succeeded in period 1 but left the relationship cannot succeed in 
period 2, and thus gets no transfer from the inside lender. Thus, in addition to con-
straints (A6), we have the constraint  s G :  T G ≥ δ ( r − 1 ) , that is, that the good type 
does not switch to an outside lender in period 2. Since the bad type is revealed in 
period 1, she cannot switch to an outside lender.
If δ < σ  ψ _ r − 1 − u ,  T G = σ ψ + δ u and  T B = 0 as before since  s G does not bind.
If σ  ψ _ r − 1 − u ≤ δ ≤  δ ∗ ,  s G binds and, therefore,  T G = δ ( r − 1 ) . Recall i c B,1 
constraint:
   T B + σ ψ + δ u ≥ −σ e + max { T G − δ e, δ ψ} .
Since max{δ ( r − 1 ) − δ e, δ ψ} = δ ψ, this constraint does not bind for δ ≤  δ ∗ .
If δ ≥  δ ∗ ,  s G binds and, therefore,  T G = δ ( r − 1 ) . Now, i c B,1 also binds and 
T B = δ(ψ − u) − σ(ψ + e).
Plugging in these transfers into the zero-profit condition σ ( ρr  −  1 )   + 
δ ρ  ( r − 1 )  ≥ ρ  T G  +  ( 1 − ρ ) T B yields the regions specified above.
Finally, as compared to the characterization of the second best when starting 
small in Proposition 8, there is a new constraint  s G :  T G ≥ δ ( r − 1 ) which is bind-
ing for some parameter values. Thus, the region in which the second best when start-
ing small can be financed under competition with noncontingent contracts shrinks 
relative to its characterization in Proposition 8.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
Two observations are crucial. First, the bad type never wants to self-finance a 
project because of Assumption 1. Second, the lender pays everything in the end of 
period 2 to create higher incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. Thus, the 
agent that decides to self-finance diverts ψ if the large project is financed in period 1 
and σ ψ if it is a small project. In the former case her payoff from self-financing is 
ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) and in the latter one it is σ ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) .
(i) The first best: Self-financing is possible if and only it  ψ _ δ ≥ 1, that is, δ ≤ ψ. If 
the good type stays with the lender, she gets at least ψ + e + δ u (Lemma 2) which 
is higher than ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) .
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The first Best when starting small.—Self-financing is possible if and only 
if  σ ψ _δ  ≥ 1, that is, δ ≤ σ ψ. If the good type stays with the lender, she gets at least σ ( ψ + e ) + δ u (Lemma 4) which is higher than σ ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) for δ ≤ σ ψ.
(ii) The second best: Self-financing is possible if and only it  ψ _ δ ≥ 1, that is, δ ≤ ψ. The cost-minimizing transfer to the good type is ψ + δ u and it is zero to the 
bad type (see Lemma 5). With self-financing the minimum transfer to the good type 
becomes ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) . Then, the second-best allocation can be financed if
  ρ r − 1 + δ ρ  ( r − 1 ) ≥ ρ  ( ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) ) ,
that is, if ρ ≥  1 _ 
r − ψ , or if self-financing is impossible, that is, if δ > ψ.
The second Best When starting small.—Self-financing is possible if and only 
if  σ ψ _δ  ≥ 1, that is, δ ≤ σ ψ. For such δ, the cost-minimizing transfer to the good 
type is σ ψ + δ u and it is zero to the bad type (see Lemma 6). With self-financing the 
minimum transfer to the good type becomes σ ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) . Then, the  second-best 
allocation can be financed if
  σ  ( ρr − 1 ) + δ ρ  ( r − 1 ) ≥ ρ  ( σ ψ + δ ( r − 1 ) ) ,
that is, if ρ ≥  1 _ 
r − ψ , or if self-financing is impossible, that is, if δ > σ ψ.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: 
 (i) The first best cannot be financed since it can be financed even when the agent 
cannot save (see Proposition 5).
 (ii) The agent can divert σ ψ in period 1 in order to decrease the loan amount 
she takes from outside lenders in period 2. If the bad type obtains the proj-
ect in period 2 and diverts the funds, she gets δ ψ. If she takes her outside 
option, she gets σ ψ + δ u. By Assumption 1, the bad type never wants 
to obtain the project in order to complete it. Thus, if δ ψ < σ ψ + δ u, 
that is, if δ < σ  ψ _ ψ − u the bad type does not apply for the loan. 
Then, any agent applying for the loan is of the good type and, there-
fore, obtains all the project revenues δ ( r − 1 ) . The minimum transfers 
are then  T G =  T B + δ ( r − 1 ) and  T B = σ ( ψ + e ) if δ ≤  δ ∗ (as in the proof 
of Proposition 5, part (ii), for ρ = 1; note that σ  ψ _ ψ − u <  δ ∗ ). However, the 
inside lender cannot break even since he makes a loss in period 1 and no 
profit in period 2, that is,
  σ  ( r − 1 ) + δ ρ  ( r − 1 ) < ρ  ( ψ + e + δ  ( r − 1 ) ) 
 +  ( 1 − ρ ) ( ψ + e ) .
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If δ ψ ≥ σ ψ + δ u, that is, if δ ≥ σ  ψ _ ψ − u the bad type prefers to apply for the 
loan from the outside lenders in order to divert it. To keep her out, the outside lend-
ers have to pay her ψ − u −  σ ψ _δ  . They pay the rest to the good type, that is, r − ( 1 −  σ ψ _δ  ) −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u −  σ ψ _δ  ) as they invested 1 −  σ ψ _δ  of their own money. 
As this rent has to be higher than ψ, ρ has to be higher than  ρ sav comp ≡  ψ − u −  
σ ψ _ δ  _r − 1 − u  for 
competition and savings to have any bite. The overall utility of the good type is then 
σ ψ + δ  ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ  ( ψ − u −  σ ψ _δ  ) ) since she spends  σ ψ _δ  on co-financing the 
project in period 2.
Analogously to the proof of Proposition 5, part (ii), the minimum transfers 
are  T G =  T B + δ ( r − 1 −  1 − ρ _ρ   ( ψ − u −  σ ψ _δ  ) ) and  T B = σ ( ψ + e ) if δ ≤  δ ∗ 
and  T B = δ  ( ψ − u ) if δ ≥  δ ∗ . Plugging them into the zero-profit condition 
 ( r − 1 ) ( σ + δρ ) ≥ ρ  T G +  ( 1 − ρ )  T B yields the following condition:
  δ _ sav comp ≡ σ  ψ  ( 2 − ρ ) + e −  ( r − 1 )    __ ( 1 − ρ ) ( ψ − u )   ≤ δ ≤ σ  
r − 1 − ψ  ( 1 − ρ )   __ ρ  ( ψ − u )   ≡  
_ δ sav comp .
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